Behavioral Recognition: Computer Algorithms Alerting Law Enforcement to Suspicious Activity by King, Jr., J Darwin
  
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 
United States License.  
 
This site is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-
Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
Behavioral Recognition: Computer Algorithms Alerting 
Law Enforcement to Suspicious Activity 
J Darwin King, Jr. 
 
 
Volume XV—Fall 2014 
 
ISSN 2164-800X (online)  
 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.159 
 
http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
Journal of Technology  
Law & Policy 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XV—Fall 2014 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.159 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
101 
 
Behavioral Recognition: Computer Algorithms Alerting 
Law Enforcement to Suspicious Activity 
J Darwin King, Jr.* 
INTRODUCTION 
Surveillance through the use of closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) is 
becoming more widespread in the daily lives of Americans—a movement fueled by 
the recent war on terrorism. The decreasing cost of this technology has made it 
more available than ever before. High technology surveillance, once reserved for 
only the most secure locations, now appears in public common spaces. Urban 
centers faced with budgetary concerns see automation in surveillance as a way to 
cut costs while still protecting the greatest number of citizens.  
Despite its benefits, we must consider the costs to our individual freedoms 
that the use of these increasingly sophisticated systems may entail. Most troubling 
is the deployment of a new technology called behavioral recognition.1 This system 
couples traditional CCTV systems with a monitoring station that uses a computer 
algorithm to detect events that may be suspicious.2 Conducted completely free of 
human monitoring, behavioral recognition shares commonalities with the more 
widely known technology of facial recognition.3 However, this new type of 
technology identifies certain behaviors of an individual as a whole instead of facial 
features.4 
The City of Pittsburgh has tall buildings, many bridges and tunnels, sports and 
entertainment venues, and a convention center that all demand, in today’s world, 
protection from potential terrorist attacks. In 2013, the City reported 46 homicides, 
                                                          
* J.D. candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2016. The author would like to 
thank Professor David Harris for insightful discussion and reference suggestions. And thanks to Tulsa, 
Isabel, and Elisabeth for their love and support. 
1 BRS LABS (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://www.brslabs.com. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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90 rapes, 967 robberies, and 1,259 aggravated assaults.5 Pittsburgh, like most 
American cities, has an interest in improving public safety. In 2007, Pittsburgh 
created a plan to provide traditional CCTV coverage of the downtown area, along 
bridges, and Point State Park.6 The City set aside $3.4 million in port security 
money, which included $2.6 million in federal funds and $862,000 in city money.7 
The proposal called for the linking of cameras owned by the city, county, state, and 
private companies, allowing for a central monitoring system for crime deterrence 
and public safety.8 In a later decision, Pittsburgh City Council approved the 
installation of cameras in high crime neighborhoods.9 Former Councilman and 
current Mayor of Pittsburgh William Peduto asked that the administration add 
language outlining a privacy policy within the legislation before the final vote.10 
Since Pittsburgh currently uses traditional CCTV systems, the use of behavioral 
recognition could be a logical next step. Behavioral recognition would allow a city 
to safeguard large areas without the need for personnel, thus maximizing safety and 
minimizing employee costs.  
Before the implementation of a behavioral recognition system in Pittsburgh, 
new rules would have to be put into place to address Fourth Amendment and 
general privacy concerns inherent in its use. The public should be made aware of 
the use of this technology in public places, behavioral data collected by third-
parties such as private businesses should be released only upon a valid warrant by 
law enforcement, individuals should not be tracked over large geographic areas 
without a warrant, and law enforcement should have procedural guidelines of when 
and how it may use the information gathered. 
I. HISTORY OF BEHAVIORAL RECOGNITION IN SURVEILLANCE 
We have seen the introduction of police operated CCTV systems in large 
cities; both the number of cities and the size of the coverage are expanding, such as 
                                                          
5 City of Pittsburgh Dept. of Public Safety Bureau of Police Annual Report 2013 (Oct. 31, 2014, 
12:56 PM), http://apps.pittsburghpa.gov/dps/2013_Annual_Report_draft_(final).pdf. 
6 Rich Lord, Network of Surveillance Cameras Proposed for Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Oct. 31, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2007/06/27/Network-of-
surveillance-cameras-proposed-for-Pittsburgh/stories/200706270157. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Rich Lord, Council Oks Surveillance Cameras Around City, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
(Oct. 31, 2014, 12:10 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/neighborhoods/2007/09/20/Council-OKs-
surveillance-cameras-around-city/stories/200709200260. 
10 Id. 
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in the subway system of San Francisco which already uses the behavioral 
recognition technology.11 However, at the present moment, there are few 
procedural controls in place for the use of CCTV systems. The technology has 
advanced very quickly and courts have been slow to respond. Such progress, 
coupled with a lack of rules, poses a significant danger to our daily lives. High-
resolution cameras, the kind that can read papers held in a person’s hands, along 
with facial recognition cameras, have piqued the public’s interests and fears.  
Ten years ago, The New York Times published an article discussing the 
emergence of artificial intelligence as a way to monitor areas and flag suspicious 
events.12 The article spoke of the implementation of this smart system by the year 
2006.13 Richard M. Daley, serving as Mayor of Chicago at the time, claimed that 
the system would make the streets safer.14 Mayor Daley said, “They’re the next 
best thing to having police officers stationed at every potential troubling spot.”15 
The statement that the system may be “the next best thing” is critical, since a 
computer algorithm can hardly substitute for a law enforcement officer as witness 
to an event. The 2004 article described a system that alerts police whenever 
someone “wander[s] aimlessly in circles,” “pulls a car onto the shoulder of a 
highway, or leaves a package and walks away from it.”16 The surveillance 
technology described ten years ago is now ready for widespread deployment and is 
on our streets. In fact, Louisiana’s Port Fourchon deployed this technology to 
safeguard the maritime port from terrorism with the help of the Department of 
Defense.17 The system can alert law enforcement in real time to threats of flagged 
suspicious behavior and allows for the integration of multiple agencies both at the 
state and federal levels.18 
                                                          
11 Liz Klimas, Will These Next-Gen Surveillance Cameras in Calif. Detect Crime Before It’s Even 
Committed?, THE BLAZE (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/06/05/will-
these-next-gen-surveillance-cameras-in-calif-detect-crime-before-its-even-committed/. 
12 Stephen Kinzer, Chicago Moving to ‘Smart’ Surveillance Cameras, THE N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 
2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/21/national/21cameras.html. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Louisiana’s Port Fourchon Installs Next-Generation Video Surveillance System, CRESCENT 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://www.asmag.com/showpost/13142.aspx. 
18 Id. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XV—Fall 2014 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2014.159 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
II. THE BEHAVIORAL ANALYTIC TECHNOLOGY 
The technology behind behavioral recognition involves computer algorithms 
and implementations well outside the scope of this work. At its core, however, the 
system uses traditional CCTV cameras that feed to a central monitoring station.19 
In many cases, human surveillance of the video feed is not required. The computer 
identifies preprogrammed suspicious “events” and alerts humans to a possible 
security concern.20 One company, BRS Labs, leads in this area of technology.21 
BRS has spoken on the confusing nature of interpreting video surveillance and on 
the need to monitor multiple feeds from a large area with little human staffing.22 
The company touts its product as solving these problems by “using behavioral 
recognition technology to deliver actionable insights in real-time, so that users 
know how to apply results intuitively, without analytics training.”23 Its product, 
AISight, “teaches itself to recognize unexpected patterns within massive volumes 
of data . . . by alerting users to unusual situations.”24 A named benefit of the 
technology includes AISight’s ability to “[adapt] to changing conditions much like 
a human brain does, but without fatigue, boredom, or distraction.”25  
III. EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM BEHAVIORAL RECOGNITION 
The text of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, 
The right of the people to be secure in their person, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported 
by Oath or affirmation, and particularity describing the 
place to be searched, and persons or things to be 
seized.26 
                                                          
19 BRS LABS (Dec. 18, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://www.brslabs.com. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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The use of behavioral recognition requires courts to interpret constitutional 
safeguards in light of advancements in technology. The Fourth Amendment 
requires probable cause for the seizure of a person by a law enforcement officer.27 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio carved out an exception to the 
probable cause standard.28 In Terry, the petitioner sought relief for the seizure of a 
concealed weapon on his person obtained through an allegedly illegal search.29 
Petitioner claimed there was no probable cause to arrest the petitioner, and that the 
“stop and frisk” was a warrantless intrusion.30 The Court held that an exception to 
the probable cause requirement exists if there is a reasonable suspicion that an 
individual has or is about to commit a crime.31 Since the seizure is based on 
reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, the “scope of the search must be ‘strictly 
tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation 
permissible.”32 The seizure must also serve a legitimate government interest.33  
While the courts have not specifically addressed the technology of behavioral 
recognition as it relates to the rights provided in the Fourth Amendment, they have 
addressed such rights in roughly analogous situations. The use of a computer to 
flag suspicious events can be compared to a law enforcement officer flagging 
particular people based on behavior and characteristics that are considered 
suspicious. One such example of law enforcement using a profile to detect possible 
criminal behavior is the “drug courier profile,” the kind used to identify suspicious 
individuals from a crowd in United States v. Sokolow based on such individual 
behaviors like buying a ticket with case, checking no luggage, travelling to known 
drug destinations, and acting nervously.34 The Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment35 does not preclude using “probabilistic” facts describing personal 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 9–10. 
31 Id. at 30. 
32 Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)). 
33 Id. at 20–21. 
34 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3–14 (1989). 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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characteristics of drug couriers36 as a basis for a finding of “reasonable suspicion,” 
a standard that justifies a brief detention of the suspected individual.37 
When considering the tactics used by law enforcement officers in the Sokolow 
case, the similarities with behavioral recognition become more apparent.38 On 
July 22, 1984, Andrew Sokolow purchased two round-trip airline tickets for a flight 
from Honolulu to Miami that was to depart later that day.39 Sokolow paid cash at 
the ticket counter from a large wad of money, gave an alias, travelled with a 
companion using her real name, and neither checked any luggage.40 The ticket 
agent noted that Sokolow acted nervously and notified the Honolulu Police 
Department of Sokolow’s ticket purchase.41 Investigation revealed no person listed 
under Sokolow’s alias, Andrew Kray, in Hawaii and the telephone number 
provided was that of Sokolow’s roommate.42 
On July 25, 1984, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) agents 
identified Sokolow during a stopover at the Los Angeles Airport and said he, 
“appeared to be very nervous and was looking all around the waiting area.”43 When 
Sokolow arrived in Honolulu with his companion, the DEA continued their 
surveillance noting that Sokolow was still wearing the same clothes from when he 
purchased the tickets and neither of the individuals had checked any luggage.44 
When the couple exited the terminal and tried to hail a taxi, four DEA agents 
moved in to stop Sokolow and requested his airline ticket and identification.45 At 
this time Sokolow said he did not have either of the documents, admitted his real 
name, and that he was travelling under his mother’s maiden name of Kray.46 
The agents escorted the couple to the airport’s DEA office where their 
luggage was sniffed by a narcotics detection canine, which ultimately alerted the 
                                                          
36 Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1420 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
37 United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1585–86 (9th Cir. 1987). 
38 See generally Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
39 Id. at 4. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 5. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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DEA agents to Sokolow’s brown shoulder bag.47 After securing a search warrant, a 
search of the shoulder bag yielded no illicit drugs, but did uncover suspicious items 
leading to suspicion of Sokolow’s participation in drug trafficking.48 A more 
thorough search using the canine alerted agents to a second bag for which the 
agents did not have a search warrant and, since it was late in the day, the agents 
allowed Sokolow to leave the airport.49 After obtaining a search warrant for the 
second bag, the DEA agents found 1.063 kilograms of cocaine.50 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the cocaine 
evidence was inadmissible.51 The Supreme Court noted the standard of “reasonable 
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’”52 In 
other words, the Supreme Court upheld the use of the “drug courier profile” the 
Ninth Circuit had previously rejected. Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to state that 
the Fourth Amendment requires “some minimum level of justification” for making 
a stop and the officer must be capable of explaining “more than an inchoate and 
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”53 Reasonable suspicion allows for the brief 
detention of an individual by law enforcement—called a “Terry stop.”54 However, 
these “Terry” stops may be justified even when the “proof of wrongdoing” is less 
than “a preponderance of the evidence”55 and the court must look at the “totality of 
the circumstances.”56  
There is a direct relationship between the DEA’s “drug courier profile” and 
the use of a computer algorithm to flag suspicious activity. Both sets of criteria rely 
on preconceived notions of what criminal behavior may look like, which can lead 
to problems. For example, the behavioral recognition software may flag an 
individual for passing through the same area multiple times. This individual’s 
behavior could be a sign of nefarious activity, or that person could simply be lost. 
Nevertheless, once the event is flagged and an officer is dispatched to the 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 11. 
52 Id. at 7. 
53 Id. 
54 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
55 Sokolow, 290 U.S. at 7 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 
56 Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). 
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individual’s location, the officer may briefly detain the individual and ask questions 
such as, “who are you and what are you doing here?” The officer can encourage 
answers to these questions that raise the level of evidence to probable cause, which 
may lead to arrest. In this manner, computer algorithms compile a database of 
actions and identify certain behaviors as suspicious, putting individuals at risk of 
police detention as they go about their daily lives. Especially striking is the fact that 
these algorithmic determinations can occur outside the confines of more high-
security environments and without intervention by individuals who can actually 
bear witness to the putatively suspicious behaviors. 
IV. WIDESPREAD NETWORKS OF BEHAVIORAL RECOGNITION AND THE 
MOSAIC THEORY 
As the technology of behavioral recognition becomes more available and 
capable of covering longer spans of a person’s daily route, a concern for the 
degradation of individual rights grows. The technology is adaptive and capable of 
learning.57 While much of the computer algorithm is still undisclosed, it is not a 
stretch to assume that law enforcement could use a widespread network of CCTV 
coupled with behavioral recognition to cast a wide net and follow an individual for 
an entire day, or longer, thus creating a “mosaic” of an individual’s movements and 
behavior over time. 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.58 From 
an analytical perspective, Fourth Amendment searches require the examination of 
law enforcement’s actions in a sequential manner, where one of the actions must 
trigger the Fourth Amendment. However, the “mosaic” theory states that searches 
can be analyzed as a single unit, instead of individualized steps, so that although no 
single step triggers the Fourth Amendment, the search as a whole can fall under 
Fourth Amendment protection.59 
The Supreme Court ruled on the issue of the mosaic theory in United States v. 
Jones.60 Antoine Jones, a nightclub owner, was suspected of selling cocaine and 
crack, eventually leading to the discovery of large amounts of drugs and cash.61 
Investigators used wiretaps, pen registers, informants, and camera footage of the 
                                                          
57 BRS LABS (Oct. 24, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.brslabs.com. 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
59 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 947–49. 
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entrance to the nightclub to place the suspects under visual surveillance, and, using 
search warrants, obtained text messages and utilized Jones’ cell phone and 
associated cell tower location to triangulate Jones’ location.62  
However, the investigators used a tactic that brought Jones’ Fourth 
Amendment rights in question. The officers obtained a warrant from a D.C. judge 
to install a global positioning system (“GPS”) device on a Jeep Grand Cherokee 
belonging to Jones’ wife.63 At the time it was unclear if such a warrant was 
necessary since D.C. courts had not addressed the issue and other federal courts 
had already decided that a warrant was not necessary for this tactic.64 The warrant 
required installation of the GPS device on the vehicle in D.C. within ten days; 
however, law enforcement installed the device on the eleventh day, outside of the 
jurisdiction, in Maryland.65 This GPS device recorded the location of the vehicle 
for 28 days and was accurate to location within about 100 feet.66 The GPS recorded 
thousands of pages of location data logging Jones’ movement to show his 
colocation with conspirators and the stash house containing drugs and money later 
seized.67 At trial, Jones moved to suppress the GPS evidence since the location 
logger recorded when the vehicle was in his personal garage, and was therefore 
subject to Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.68 The trial court allowed the use of location data obtained from anywhere 
outside the home.69 The court cited United States v. Knotts, a similar case that 
allowed the inclusion of evidence from a radio beeper that alerted police to the 
suspect’s whereabouts.70 Knotts concluded that an individual in a vehicle in public 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy, as that individual conveyed the details of 
his or her location to the public at that time.71 
However, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it offered a different 
view. The Court reasoned that the GPS technology was not only very different, but 
                                                          
62 Id. at 947. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 947–49. 
68 Id. at 948. 
69 Id. 
70 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
71 Id. 
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also more advanced compared to a radio beeper and was thus distinguishable from 
Knotts.72 The GPS technology was found to be more invasive than other sense-
enhancing technology because it could plot an individual’s movements over a long 
period of time and over a large geographic area.73 The Court agreed with Jones that 
the use of GPS was an invasive search, because although a person’s whereabouts 
are known to both passersby and police alike when out in public, the collection of 
location data for 28 days is nearly impossible without the GPS technology.74 
Justice Sotomayor summed up the problem in her concurrence by stating, “GPS 
monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, 
religious, and sexual associations.”75 Justice Sotomayor also added, “[T]he 
government can store such records and effectively mine them for information years 
into the future.”76 
With this in mind, the question arises of whether behavioral recognition 
technology is analogous to GPS tracking. Certainly, installation of a GPS device 
requires the physical occupation of a part of the individual’s vehicle whereas 
behavioral recognition technology does not. However, the distinction ends there. 
Both technologies allow the following of a suspect over a large geographical area, 
possibly for a long period of time. Using this technology, not only can police 
monitor an individual’s movements within the subway network, but expansion of 
the system can allow observance of an individual’s behavior beyond the subway 
system. Additionally, since the data may be stored for a long time, or even 
indefinitely, investigators could go back and reconstruct the individual’s 
movements. The reasons for doing so may not even arise from a crime that has 
actually occurred. Instead the computer could flag a suspicious event, then, using 
the algorithm, search for that individual in footage from other locations and other 
points in time to map movements. Justice Ginsburg hinted at this notion, stating, 
“For no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction 
between a day in the life and a way of life.”77 Thus, a balance must be struck 
between public safety and intrusions into the daily lives of individuals. 
                                                          
72 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951–52. 
73 Id. at 961. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 955 (citing People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (2009)). 
76 Id. at 956 (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (2010)). 
77 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (2012). 
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V. CURRENT TREND OF THE SUPREME COURT: RECOGNIZING A 
HIGHER LEVEL OF PERSONAL LIBERTY? 
A recent Supreme Court decision concerning the search of cell phones 
collected at the time of arrest bears similarity to behavioral recognition, and may 
suggest a trend away from the widespread admission of digital evidence.78 In Riley 
v. California, evidence obtained from arrested individuals’ cell phones led to 
additional charges.79 The Court allowed for the physical inspection of cell phones 
to ensure they were not weapons, but it did not allow searches of digital data on the 
phone without a warrant, even with a valid arrest.80  
The interpretation of new cases in light of Riley have already entered the 
judicial system. In United States v. Guerrero, the defendant argued for protection 
of cell-site information based on the privacy concerns stated in Riley.81 The court 
rejected this argument by distinguishing the search in Riley, which was a search of 
personal data incident to arrest, from the search of Guerrero’s cell site information. 
The court held that a cell phone owner does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in information held by the third-party service provider.82 The use of 
behavioral recognition in a public space seems to be a fusion of these two types of 
search criteria. It appears, given the decisions of Riley and Jones, that in instances 
where a search warrant was necessary, the Court hesitates to allow evidence of all 
electronic data confirming an individual’s whereabouts and life. Behavioral 
recognition may well fall into these categories with respect to Fourth Amendment 
protections, requiring warrants for the collection of information.  
VI. BEHAVIORAL RECOGNITION AS SENSE-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGY 
Use of a computer algorithm to detect suspicious behavior is arguably 
equivalent to law enforcement reviewing all CCTV camera feeds at once and 
processing that information. However, the ability to monitor so many feeds over 
such a wide area with little personnel suggests something much more than 
“monitoring and processing” and is perhaps best examined by comparing these 
algorithms to sense-enhancing technology. No one officer or even a small group 
could possibly process that extent of information in real time. Therefore, behavioral 
                                                          
78 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 See United States v. Guerrero, No. 13-50376 (5th Cir. Sept. 11, 2014). 
82 Id. 
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recognition technology allows for the enhancement of law enforcement’s senses. In 
Kyllo v. United States, a thermal imager identified a drug growing operation within 
a home after the grow lights heated the home to a temperature higher than 
neighboring homes.83 The Court stated, “[W]e think that obtaining by sense-
enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could 
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area,’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in 
question is not in general public use.”84 The Court went on to state, “While the 
technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must 
take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”85 The Court in Kyllo found a violation of Fourth Amendment rights 
since the technology peered into the home before issuance of a warrant.  
Unlike the sense-enhancing technology used in Kyllo, the use of behavioral 
recognition technology takes place mostly in public in areas that carry a diminished 
expectation of privacy. Kyllo dealt with the use of technology to conduct a search 
on an individual’s home, which carries with it the highest expectation of privacy.86 
Therefore, the Kyllo decision is not a direct comparison. However, the Supreme 
Court hinted at the possibility of a broader interpretation of intrusions upon 
freedoms through the use of technology, especially if such technology is not in 
widespread use.87 The Court noted that technology not in general public use might 
be problematic in search and seizure cases as the technology quickly advances.88 At 
this time, behavioral recognition technology remains unknown to many members 
of the general population. Few individuals would even suspect the use of such a 
technology to analyze daily movements. The Kyllo decision illustrates the difficulty 
the legal system has in keeping laws in line with ever-developing technology. 
VII. BEHAVIORAL RECOGNITION REGARDED AS AN INFORMANT TO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Behavioral recognition allows law enforcement to collect facts relating to 
possible crime, thus serving a function similar to that of police informants. In 
Florida v. J.L., an anonymous call alerted police to a young black male carrying a 
                                                          
83 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30 (2001). 
84 Id. at 34 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).  
85 Id. at 36. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
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gun.89 The tip described the bus stop location and the clothes of the suspect, but 
when police arrived at the bus stop, they did not see a gun or notice any unusual 
movements.90 A frisk of the suspect revealed that he did in fact have a firearm in 
his possession and the Court ruled it an unreasonable search, stating, “[U]nlike a tip 
from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held 
responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone 
seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.”91 
If a computer algorithm is considered a tipster to police, questions arise 
regarding which human party can be considered the informant. Potential answers 
include the officer working the central monitoring station or possibly the computer 
programmer of the algorithm used in detection. Either of these parties may be the 
reliable informant. However, the responsibility of who is to blame for incorrectly 
flagging suspicious yet benign activity is unclear. If the human source of the 
underlying reason for flagging a suspicious activity cannot be determined, then the 
informing algorithm becomes much more anonymous, which diminishes the 
credibility of the information that compels a search or seizure and can lead to 
exclusion of certain evidence at trial.  
CONCLUSION 
The removal of human discretion has both advantages and drawbacks. 
Certainly, behavioral recognition technology allows for the monitoring of 
expansive areas with very little human staff involved. The public as a whole may 
be safer for the installation of this technology. However, this safety comes with the 
price of our own liberties. Not only is the computer watching the actions of 
citizens, it makes the determination of what constitutes a behavior worthy of 
investigation by a law officer. For example, what if a person exited their vehicle 
and walked away for a legitimate reason, such as saving a runaway dog. Or a 
tourist unfamiliar with the city passes through the same area multiple times with no 
nefarious plans. Suppose the behavioral analysis algorithm flags these innocent 
individuals and the police stop and detain them. Suppose they are searched. It is 
possible they may have contraband on their person wholly unrelated to the reason 
for the stop. No human witnessed the original act nor did the human make the 
determination to stop the individual. Courts may be slow to understand or 
                                                          
89 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 270 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). 
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transform law in light of this new technology. Therefore, technological advances 
such as behavioral analytics could create constitutional problems in our society. 
The new technology raises important Fourth Amendment issues the courts 
have yet to address. Preprogrammed computer algorithms used to detect possible 
crime are analogous to law enforcement’s use of the “drug courier profile,” which 
is an accepted law enforcement tactic. Behavioral recognition could increase the 
number of stop and frisk stops in a region. While use of a computer may decrease 
the targeting of certain demographics, the deployment of behavioral recognition in 
poor areas could counter balance this effect. It remains to be seen how the courts 
will view the technology as possible sense-enhancing technology that is not in 
widespread use. However, these concerns become less troublesome in public areas 
with diminished expectations of privacy. The widespread use of the technology in a 
city could track individuals over large spaces and time. Thus, it becomes simple to 
record and map a mosaic of a person’s life, contacts, habits, and preferences. Law 
enforcement may later use recorded information to aid in charging an individual. 
Accountability of who really observes the suspicious event is blurred. The 
computer programmer, the agent at the monitoring station, or the interdicting 
officer are all possible “witnesses” to the event. However, none of them may have 
actually observed the flagged event firsthand.  
Behavioral recognition will continue to develop. This will lead to more 
powerful algorithms, cheaper cost, and more widespread use. The court system can 
be slow to adapt to and understand new technology. By failing to address these 
issues, our liberties slowly erode. Proper safeguards can stop this. City councils 
must think through the implications of smart CCTV systems before deployment. 
By ignoring individual liberty issues, cities face legal challenges and possible 
exclusion of evidence from criminal cases. Reaching a balance between personal 
rights and the safety of our cities can insure the interests of both government and 
individuals. 
